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Using  a  panel  of  linked  employer-employee  data  from  Portugal,  we  follow  the 
performance of firms and workers during the first decade of 2000s in terms of the risk 
of firm shutdown and of chances of workers’ entering unemployment. This allows us 
to identify the characteristics of unsuccessful firms and workers over this period and, 
of most interest, whether these characteristics changed as a consequence of the global 
crisis. In addition, and different from previous works, we (i) assess whether there is a 
differential effect to crisis depending on firm size, and (ii) relate the workers’ risk of 
unemployment to the hazard of firm shutdown. In the analyses of hazard of shutdown 
and  risk  of  unemployment  most  of  the  effects  of  observed  covariates  remained 
unchanged  through  the  business  cycle.  There  is  a  differential  response  to  crisis 
depending on firm size. A small firm’s risk of shutdown is 9 times the risk of a large 
firm. However, the chances of becoming unemployed are less than twice larger for a 
worker in a small firm. This suggests that large firms may be less likely to shutdown, 
but they are not a shield from unemployment. 
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1.  Introduction  
The  Portuguese  labour  market  conditions  in  the  first  decade  of  the  2000s  can  be 
summarised  by  splitting  the  decade  into  two  sub  periods.  In  the  first  half  of  the 
decade, Portugal is reported by the OECD as a country with high rates of labour force 
participation and low unemployment rates. This strong labour market performance 
was typically explained by some flexibility in real wage adjustment and the expansion 
of atypical contracts, such as temporary and/or fixed term employment contracts. The 
policy  challenge  was  to  raise  income  levels  of  the  population  and  increase 
competitiveness through improving the productivity of the labour force via policies 
aimed  at  enhancing  human  capital  and  labour  mobility.  Low-skilled  sectors  were 
facing  higher  levels  of  competition  from  new  EU  members,  suggesting  that  the 
Portuguese economy needed to shift its production towards more high-skilled/higher-
value-added  sectors.  Investments  in  education  and  in  the  acquisition  of  skills, 
according to the OECD, would make the labour force more adaptable, foster the use 
of new technologies and develop the high-skill sectors of the economy. 
In  the  second  half  of  the  decade  the  OECD  reported  concerns  about  rising 
unemployment  and  the  need  to  prevent  cyclical  unemployment  from  becoming 
structural  (OECD,  2010).  More  attention  was  drawn  to  restrictive  employment 
legislation which acted as a barrier to labour mobility. Low levels of job mobility 
gave  incentives  to  firms  to  use  fixed-term  contracts  which  reduced  incentives  to 
provide training (OECD, 2006). The strategy to improve labour market conditions 
was  to  impose  less  restrictive  employment  legislation  in  order  to  facilitate  labour 
mobility, the creation of jobs, and the integration of job seekers back to work. The 
expectations were for this to shorten unemployment spells and encourage firms to 
offer permanent contracts and provide training opportunities for their employees.  
 
The changes in the labour market conditions and adjustments in the focus of policy 
challenges  suggested  by  the  OECD  are  likely  to  be  related  to  the  changes  in  the 
international  economic  conditions.  Labour  markets  become  more  volatile  during 
periods of unanticipated exogenous shocks such as the world-wide financial crisis of 
2008-2010.  In a period of global economic crisis, disturbances in aggregate demand 
drive firms to adjust their production structure and/or their investment decisions, and 
cause some to shutdown; while some workers are made redundant and lose their jobs. 2 
 
Furthermore,  the  recent  financial  crisis  made  access  to  credit  from  banks  more 
difficult and imposed financial constraints on firms and individuals. It is documented 
that credit restraints lowers particularly the growth and investment of small businesses 
(Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Bernanke et  al., 1996), the predominant firm size in 
Portugal. It is also argued that there is a differential response of firms, in terms of firm 
growth and survival, depending on their access to capital and that smaller firms are 
more sensitive to monetary shocks than larger firms (Berger and Udell, 2002; Gertler 
and Gilchrist, 1994).  
 
The rather unique labour market circumstances, the impact of the financial crisis and 
its potential differential effect on the  growth and survival of firms depending on their 
size, prompt our interest in the Portuguese case and motivate us to split our analyses 
in two periods: before and during the economic crisis. Our aim is to identify not only 
the determinants of some labour market phenomena, but also whether the effects vary 
with  the  business  cycle.  In  particular,  in  this  paper  we  identify  changes  to  the 
Portuguese labour market over the period 2002–2009, in terms of both the survival of 
firms  and  of  workers’  probabilities  of  becoming  unemployed.  We  describe  the 
characteristics of the Portuguese labour market between 2002 and 2009 and address a 
number of research questions. What determines the risk of firm shutdown? Were there 
differences in the dynamics of firm destruction before and during the global economic 
crisis? Which workers were more likely to become unemployed? Furthermore, since 
84% of Portuguese firms employ less than 10 workers (micro firms) and given the 
potential  for  a  differential  effect  of  financial  constraints  on  firm  performance,  we 
disaggregate some of our results by firm size. 
 
Our results confirm that firm- and industry-specific variables as well as macroeconomic 
conditions are significant determinants of the risk of firm shutdown. The average risk of a 
firm shutting down is larger in the period of crisis, and the effect of some covariates 
changes  with  the  business  cycle.  There  is  also  a  differentiated  risk  of  firm’s  closing 
depending on firm size. Micro and small firms not only have a larger risk of failure when  
compared to other firm sizes, but also the chances of failure of smaller firms rises more 
during  economic  downturns.  This  supports  the  hypothesis  that  large  firms  face 
economic  downturns  by  adjusting  their  structure  of  production  and  employment 
levels, while small firms are more prone to leave the market.  3 
 
A comparison of the impacts of worker characteristics on the probability of entering 
unemployment pre-crisis and during the crisis suggests that generally there is little 
change, and that the crisis did not affect which workers became more or less likely to 
become unemployed or the relative sizes of these effects. The stability of the effects 
of  observed  covariates,  associated  to  the  smaller  effect  of  the  unobserved  match-
quality and of the intrinsic risk of firm shutdown suggest that sectoral shocks are 
relatively  more  important  a  determinant  of  unemployment  during  economic 
downturns. The analyses of the probability of unemployment by firm size also support 
this hypothesis, as it more than doubled between 2002 and 2009 for all firm sizes. 
This suggests that despite being less likely to shutdown, larger firms do not shield the 
worker from unemployment. 
 
In the following Section we describe the data used, the Quadros de Pessoal from 
Portugal.  In  Section  3  we  present  our  empirical  strategy,  which  focus  on  the 
determinants of the hazard of firm shutdown and on the determinants of worker’s 
probability of unemployment. Estimation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2.  Data 
The data used in this analysis are the Quadros de Pessoal (QP) from  Portugal, a 
longitudinal data set with matched information on workers and firms. These data have 
been collected annually since 1985 by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and 
the participation of firms with registered employees is compulsory. The data include 
all firms (over 250 thousand per year) and employees (more than two million per 
year) within the Portuguese private sector. Our focus is on patterns of firm closure 
and worker mobility before and during the recession, and so we use data collected 
from 2002 to 2009.
2 Each firm and each worker has a unique registration number 
which  allows  them  to  be  traced  over  time.  All  information  –  on  both  firms  and 
workers  –  is  reported  by  the  firm.  We  restrict  our  analysis  to  manufacturing  and 
services,  and  the  resulting  sample  is  composed  of  537,896  unique  firms  (who 
                                                 
2QP data were not collected in 2001, hence our analysis starts in 2002 rather than 2000. 2009 is the 
most recent year for which the data set has been built.  4 
 
contribute  2,400,388  firm-year  observations)  and  4,526,413  workers  (mounting  to 
20,603,105 worker-year observations) over the period.
 3 
 
In Table 1 we provide a brief description of the data by year, and report the number of 
employed workers, the number of firms, the number of new firms, the number of 
firms that shut down, firm death rates and the unemployment rate. It is possible from 
the raw data to see the effects of the 2008 global crisis. With respect to employment 
levels (column i), after consecutive  years of systematic net job creation, over 100 
thousand  jobs  were  lost  between  2008  and  2009  (from  nearly  2.8  million  to  2.7 
million employed workers in 2009). The yearly stock of firms (column ii) follows a 
similar pattern: the number of private sector firms grew from 2002 (269,943 firms) to 
2008 (323,524 firms), while in 2009 there was a net destruction of firms (to 317,155) 
– about six thousand firms fewer than in 2008. The number of firms created per year 
(column  iii)  grew  continuously  over  the  period  from  2002  until  2008  and  nearly 
25,000 firms were created in 2008. However, in 2009 only 20,976 new firms were 
created,  similar  to  the  number  in  2005  (when  20,819  firms  were  created).  Firm 
destruction (column iv) is identified as the year in which firms were last observed in 
the data, and  we assume that firms die within  the 12 subsequent months (that is, 
between t and t+1). Until 2006 less than 31,000 firms died yearly. The number of 
firm closures rose to 37,000 in the period 2007-2008 and to 45,000 between 2008 and 
2009. The rates of firm shutdown (computed as the number of deaths between t and 
t+1 over the number of firms in year t) ranged from 9% in the first half of the decade 
to 14% by the end of it (column v). These patterns of creation and destruction of jobs 
and firms are reflected in the official unemployment rate (column vi) which rose 2 
percentage points between 2008 and 2009, when it exceeded 9%.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
In Table 2 we summarise the distributions of firms and employment by firm size. The 
Portuguese economy is dominated by small and medium sized firms (column i), 84% 
of firms have less than 10 employees (micro firms) and almost 14% are small firms 
(with 10 to 49 employees). That is, 98% of Portuguese firms employ less 50 workers 
                                                 
3We do not consider the primary sector (agriculture, fishing, extraction) owing to most firms being 
family businesses and coverage of this sector in the QP data set thus being low.  5 
 
overall. Medium (50 to 249 employees) and large (250+ employees) firms correspond 
to 2% of the total number of firms in the country, but they account for nearly 45% of 
total employment.
4 The 98% of micro and small firms account for the remaining 55% 
of  total  employment  (column  ii).  Most  of  the  dynamics  of  firm  creation  and 
destruction (columns iii and iv) happens amongst small and micro firms: 99% of firms 
created and destroyed are either small or micro firms. Larger firms are less likely to 
be destroyed than smaller firms.
  
 
 [Table 2 about here] 
  
In Table 3 we present the rates of firm destruction by year and firm size. For all firm 
size  categories,  death  rates  of  firms  are  relatively  stable  up  until  2006,  and  then 
increase sharply in the years of the global crisis. For example, death rates of micro 
firms increased by 4 percentage points between 2006 (11%) and 2009 (15%), while 
those of small and medium sized firms increased by 3 percentage points in the same 
period (from 4% to 7% and from 3% to 6%, respectively). Death rates of large firms 
remained fairly stable over the period.  These stylized facts are consistent with the 
argument that large firms may be more likely to reflect the shocks of the economy on 
sales performance, while for smaller firms shocks and policy changes are more likely 
to be reflected in rates of survival, destruction or creation (Berger and Udell, 2002; 
Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). 
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
  
Our strategy is to identify the sample of firms in 2002 (and those who have entered 
the  panel  since)  and  follow  their  performance  over  subsequent  years in  terms  of 
survival  and  the  probability  of  shutting  down.  This  allows  us  to  identify  the 
characteristics of unsuccessful firms in this period and, of most interest, whether these 
characteristics  changed  with  the  global  financial  crisis.  That  is,  we  investigate 
whether firms that died during the recession are different from those dying previously. 
For that purpose we start by estimating the models with the full sample period (2002-
2009), and then allow the estimated coefficients to vary before and during the crisis. 
                                                 
4This  classification  of  categories  of  firm  size  (micro,  small,  medium,  large)  follows  the  European 
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC. 6 
 
We also select the sample of workers who worked in firms over this period and follow 
them over time, so we are able relate the success of the worker with the success of the 
firm.  In  particular,  we  examine  the  impact  of  the  risk  of  firm  shutdown  on  the 
probability that the worker separates becomes unemployed for a year or more. 
 
3.  Estimation  
We conduct two sets of analysis. First, we analyse the determinants of the risk of firm 
shutdown by estimating duration models of the probability of firm shutdown in t+1 
conditional on survival up to time t. In doing so, we control for the characteristics of 
the firms, of the economic environment, and of the firm’s workforce. Secondly, we 
identify the characteristics of workers who were more likely to be exposed to the 
crisis in terms of the risk of leaving the current firm (between t and t+1). 
 
3.1 Hazard of firm shutdown 
We estimate the hazard of firm shutdown between two consecutive years (t and t+1) 
using  a  discrete  time  multivariate  proportional  hazards  approach.  In  particular  we 
apply  a  complementary  log-log  model  with  firm-specific  random  effects  (Jenkins, 
2004).
5  The  nature  of  our  data  implies  that  we  have  an  inflow  sample  with  left 
truncation and right censoring (that is, we include in our sample all firms existing in 
2002 plus firms that were created between 2002 and 2009, and we observe only a 
proportion of them shutting down over the period). Because information on the year 
the  firm  was  created  is  available  in  our  data,  we  are  able  to  model  the  time 
dependence of the risk of shut down. In other words we can model the correlation 
between the probability of firm shutdown and the age of the firm. We do this using a 
non-parametric baseline hazard rate identified by duration-interval-specific dummy 
variables. We allow the baseline hazard rate to vary yearly up to the 10
th year of 
survival of the firm. We then assume the baseline hazard to be constant during the 
second and third decades of firm survival (one baseline hazard for each decade), and 
then assume the hazard to be the same for all ages after the third decade of firm 
survival. We therefore have thirteen interval-specific baseline hazard rates. 
 
                                                 
5 We use this discrete time representation of a continuous time proportional hazards model because our 
data are interval censored. That is, we know the firm leaves the panel between t and t+1 but we do not 
know the exact date when this event occurs. 7 
 
The hazard rate (h(t)) is conditional on a range of firm-level covariates (x) as well as 
firm survival (t), such that 
 x) ;  t   T |    t =   Pr(T   =   h(t) j j ³ .      Eq. 1 
Assume that firm j shuts down between t and t+1 with probability Pr(yjt=1)=  l j and 
that it survives with probability Pr(yjt=0)=1–  l j. Assume further that this probability 
is a function of covariates (x) and of an unobserved firm-specific effect (y j), such 
that the hazard rate can be expressed by the following 
j k 2 2 1 1 0 jt ... =   y b b b b l + + + + + kjt jt jt x x x . Eq. 2 
Although our underlying continuous time model is summarized by the hazard rate 
(h(t)), our data is interval-censored. Therefore, we estimate the parameters describing 
the hazard rate taking into account the discrete nature of the duration data using a 
complementary log-log specification 








- = 1 ˆ .      Eq. 4 
Where  l jt  is  the  estimated  hazard  rate  of  firm  shutdown  conditional  on  the 
characteristics of the firm, and of the economic environment (x); on survival up to 
time t; and on the firm-specific random effect y j. We assume the latter follows a 
normal  distribution  and  is  independent  from  both  time  and  the  other  explanatory 
variables.  
 
Specific characteristics of the firm and of its product market are likely to affect the 
risk of a firm exiting the market (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Mata et al, 1995; 
Holmes  et  al,  2010).  To  account  for  these  effects  we  include  in  our  vector  of 
covariates (x) a number of variables. These include firm size (micro, small, medium, 
large), as previous evidence suggests that the risk of failure is expected to be larger 
for  smaller  firms  (Berger  and  Udell,  2002;  Gertler  and  Gilchrist,  1994).  We  also 
include a measure of firm growth, defined as the percentage change in employment 
from period t to t+1, to control for adjustment processes in firm size. The ownership 
structure of the firm should also have an effect on the hazard rate of shutdown. We 
control for ownership status – that is, whether the firm is private-, public- or foreign-8 
 
owned. These ownership categories are distinguished by whether the financial capital 
necessary to constitute the firm is at least 50% owned by private-nationals, public 
entities, or private-foreign entities, respectively. We expect foreign-owned firms to be 
geographically more mobile and have higher rates of exit from the Portuguese market 
than national firms. We also control for whether a firm is multi-establishment. Multi-
plant firms are expected to have lower rates of shutdown than single establishment 
firms.  The  rationale  behind  this  is  that  multi-plant  firms  are  more  likely  to  have 
accumulated more knowledge about the economic environment and may also have a 
more  experienced  management  structure,  thus  reducing  their  chances  of  failure. 
Controls for the industry of the firm (17 sectors) and industry growth (measured as the 
percentage change in employment from t to t+1) are also included. The growth rate of 
the industry may be a signal of market growth; we expected it to be negatively related 
to the risk of shutdown. We also control for whether, within an industry, the firm is 
high wage or low wage. A firm is defined as high wage if the average wage within the 
firm is in the top quartile of the distribution of average wages of all firms within the 
industry. It is defined as low wage if the average wage is in the bottom quartile of the 
average wage distribution of all firms in the industry. Our expectation is that firms 
with higher wages are more likely to invest in training and in the provision of firm-
specific human capital, therefore are less likely to exit the market. A set of covariates 
constructed by aggregating the characteristics of workers employed at the firm is also 
included. Our hypothesis is that a more stable and skilled workforce reduces the risk 
of firm closure since such a workforce is possibly more productive and more likely to 
have accumulated firm/industry specific human capital. The covariates  included are 
the  proportion  of  workers  in  the  firm  that  have  an  upper  secondary  or  university 
education, the proportions of workers that are high- and medium-skilled
6, and the 
proportion  of  workers  with  open-ended  contracts  of  employment  in  the  firm  (as 
opposed to temporary employment contracts). Macroeconomic conditions also affect 
the survival rates of firms. To control for aggregate shocks we include both year and 
region indicators (there are six standard regions in Portugal). As discussed previously, 
time dependence is captured by variables indicating the firm’s age.
7  
                                                 
6 Firms are requested to classify workers into nine skill levels according to the complexity and 
responsibility of the tasks performed; we group these into three categories: high, medium and low 
skilled workers. 
7 Summary statistics of variables over the samples analysed (the three sub-periods) are presented in 
Table A.1 in the Appendix. 9 
 
3.2 Workers’ probability of unemployment 
In the job separation models the dependent variable  it s  equals one if the worker will 
become unemployed between t and t+1, and zero otherwise. Here we define entering 
unemployment as the worker separating from the current firm and not being observed 
in the data for more than one year (or exits the data permanently).
8 The model is 
specified as: 
it ij it x s
it e g b + + =
*       Eq. 5 
where 
*
it s denotes the unobservable propensity for the worker to separate between t 
and t+1;  it x  is a vector of observed individual, firm and job-related characteristics;  ij g  
captures the unobserved time-invariant quality of the match between the worker and 
the firm; and  it e is random error.
9 We treat  ij g as random and estimate this using a 
random effects probit model under the common assumption that  ( )
2 , 0 ~ e s e IN it  and 
are orthogonal to the covariates.  
 
Two explanations are commonly used for the mobility of workers between firms and 
sectors:  sectoral  demand  shifts,  and  worker-firm  mismatch.  The  demand  shifts 
approach argues that intersectoral job mobility arises as a response to shifts in demand 
for  labour  caused  by  shocks  in  product  preferences  and  technology  in  different 
industries  of  the  economy  (Lucas  and  Prescott,  1974;  Lillien  1982;  Abraham  and 
Katz, 1986). These shifts lead to changes in the relative marginal products of labour in 
different activities which, in turn, call for a reallocation of labour. The process of 
reallocating  workers  across  industries  involves  unemployment,  which  should  be 
frictional. In matching models, separations are a consequence of optimal reassignment 
caused by the accumulation of better information about the quality of the worker-firm 
match as time elapses. If the worker-firm pairing is a mismatch, a separation is likely 
                                                 
8 The data is a panel of private sector firms and the workers employed in such firms. Workers who 
disappear from the sample may be either in unemployment, in economic inactivity, or working in the 
public sector. As transitions from private to public sector employment are infrequent in Portugal 
(DGAEP, 2005), and economic inactivity rates (for reasons other than being in education or retirement) 
are low and declining over the 2000s (INE/Pordata, 2011), we interpret exits from the data as 
unemployment. 
9 Since we use linked employer-employee data we could choose the unobserved effects to be worker-, 
firm- or match-specific. Our choice leans towards match-specific random effects to account for the 
possibility of match quality influencing job mobility. In doing so, we are implicitly also controlling for 
unobserved time invariant worker and firm-specific effects. 
 10 
 
to happen. But, in good matches, investment in firm-specific human capital will be 
greater and the match will be less likely to end (Jovanovic, 1979a, 1979b, 1984). As 
firms pay (at least) part of the training costs, they are particularly concerned about the 
turnover of employees with firm-specific human capital and, recognizing that quits 
depend on wages, they may offer these workers a higher wage that could not be easily 
matched by competing firms (Bernhardt and Scoones, 1993).  
 
Stylized findings suggest that most mobility happens within sectors and that flows of 
workers  between  sectors  tend  to  cancel  out  (Jovanovic  and  Moffitt,  1990).  These 
findings suggest that the dynamics behind separations from firms depend on sectoral 
shocks, worker and firm’s decisions, and the quality of the worker-firm match. To 
account for the various sources of labour mobility, in our models we include a range 
of worker characteristics such as the log monthly real earnings, gender, education 
(ISCED – 4 levels) and skill levels (high, medium-, low-skilled), seniority at the firm 
and potential labour market experience, and type of employment contract (permanent 
vs. temporary).
10 Employer characteristics include firm size (micro, small, medium, 
large)  and  growth  (change  in  employment  between  t  and  t+1),  firm  ownership 
(private, public, foreign), whether the firm is multi-establishment, and whether the 
firm’s average wage is high/low compared to the average of wages paid within an 
industry.  Controls  for  location  (6  regions)  industry  of  the  firm  (17  sectors),  and 
industry growth (measured as the percentage change in employment from t to t+1) are 
also included. Year dummies capture any aggregate macroeconomic effects, such as 
fluctuations in product demand induced by the global economic crisis. The quality of 
the match is controlled for by the inclusion of the match-specific random effect. We 
also include in the worker-separation model the estimated hazard of firm shutdown. A 
positive relationship indicates that workers in firms that have higher hazards of shut 
down have a higher probability of becoming unemployed for a year or more. Our 
hypothesis is that if this effect is constant (or declines) across the business, then we 
may have a signal that the risk of unemployment in times of global macroeconomic 
                                                 
10 ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of Education (as defined by UNESCO). In 
Portugal we can identify 4 levels:  1 – up to primary education; 2 – lower secondary education; 3 – 
upper secondary education; and 4/6 – post secondary and tertiary education. 11 
 
disturbances is more related to sectoral shocks affecting the economy as a whole, than 
it is to the idiosyncratic risk of firm shutdown.
11  
 
4.  Results 
4.1 Estimates of hazards of firm-shutdown  
Estimates from the discrete-time representation of the continuous time proportional 
hazards model of firm shutdown are presented in Table 4. The reported coefficients 
are hazard ratios. They summarise the proportional effect on the hazard rate of a one 
unit change in the covariates (a coefficient above/below one implies a proportionally 
larger/smaller hazard). For the sake of clarity and brevity we omit some coefficients 
(industry, region, and aggregate characteristics of the firm’s workforce) and report 
only those of most interest.  
 
In column (i) we present estimates from the model where the whole period under 
analysis  is  considered.  We  then  estimate  models  with  the  same  specification  but 
referring to the two sub-periods relating to 2002-2005 (column ii) and 2006-2009 
(column iii). We do this to identify any changes in the impacts of the covariates on the 
hazard rate of firm shutdown before and during the global crisis. 
 
Our estimates confirm the hypothesis that firm size matters – all coefficients on the 
firm  size  indicators  are  positive  relative  to  micro-firms  and  highly  statistically 
significant. This indicates that the hazard rate of shutdown is inversely related to size 
with micro and small firms being more likely to close down than larger firms. Column 
(i) shows that over the period as a whole small firms are 68% (1-0.32) less likely to 
shutdown than micro-firms while large firms are 82% (1-0.18) less likely. The effects 
of firm size became less pronounced in 2006-09 (shown in Column ii) relative to 
2002-05  (column  iii),  that  is  all  coefficients  became  closer  to  one  –  the  baseline. 
Hence firm size was less important in explaining firm shutdowns during the financial 
crisis than in the preceding period, although it remained an important factor.  
We include the growth of the firm (percentage change in employment) between t and 
t+1  to  control  for  some  adjustment  process  in  firm  size.  The  coefficient  on  this 
                                                 
11 Summary statistics of variables over the samples analysed (the three sub-periods) are presented in 
Table A.2 in the Appendix. 12 
 
variable  is  statistically  significant.  Reducing  employment  by  10  percentage  points 
increases the hazard of firm shutdown by 0.5%. 
 
Our  estimates  indicate  that  foreign  and  public  owned  firms  have  shutdown  rates 
different from those of privately owned firms. On average public firms have a lower 
hazard rate of shutdown (0.62) while foreign owned firms have a 13% higher hazard 
of shutdown than privately owned firms (column i). However this effect only emerges 
in the pre-recession period and the effect of ownership is statistically insignificant 
during  the  crisis  years  (column  iii).  Hence  during  the  financial  crisis  public  and 
foreign  owned  firms  were  as  likely  to  shutdown  as  private  firms.  Being  a  multi-
establishment  firm,  however,  reduces  the  hazard  of  shutdown  by  40%  relative  to 
single-establishment firms and this effect persisted through the crisis. Such multi-
establishment firms may use their experience and accumulated knowledge about the 
economic environment to appropriately respond to the recession.  
 
The growth rate of the industry, used as a proxy for market growth, is important in 
determining shutdowns, but only during the recession. The effect is not statistically 
significant in the period preceding the crisis (column ii), but becomes statistically 
significant during the  global crisis: increasing employment in the industry by one 
percentage point reduces the hazard of shutdown by 1.2%.  
 
The  relative  wage  of  the  firm  is  an  important  determinant  of  the  hazard  rate  of 
shutdown. High wage firms are less likely to shutdown than average  wage firms, 
while low wage firms are more likely to shutdown. Furthermore these effects are 
more pronounced in times of economic crisis. For example, before the crisis (column 
ii) being a high wage firm within an industry was associated with a hazard rate of 
shutdown that was 19% below that of an average wage firm, while during the crisis it 
was associated with a 26% lower hazard rate of shutdown. In contrast, low wage firms 
were 23% more likely to shutdown than average wage firms pre-crisis, and 29% more 
likely during the crisis. Firms paying higher wages may be more likely to invest in 
training and in developing firm-specific human capital, which reduces their chances 
of  exiting  the  market.  Not  rejecting  this  hypothesis,  may  imply  that  investing  in 
workforce skills and firm-specific human capital is a potential means of surviving 
negative economic shocks.  13 
 
 
The  year  dummies  reflect  aggregate  macroeconomic  effects,  and  the  estimated 
impacts of the global financial crisis on the hazard of shutdown are quite strong. The 
2007 indicator relates to the period 2007-2008 when the financial crisis first hit the 
USA, and the 2008 indicator relates to 2008-2009.  Controlling for other covariates, 
for duration dependence and for time-invariant unobserved firm-specific effects, the 
hazard of firm shutdown in 2007-08 was almost three times larger than in 2002 (a 
hazard ratio of 2.8), while that in 2008-09 was almost four times larger (hazard ratio 
of 3.8). Therefore even when holding other factors constant, our estimates confirm the 
sharp rise in the year-on-year rates of firm shutdowns obtained from the raw data 
presented in our descriptive statistics.
 12  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The pattern of duration dependence estimated for each sample is presented in Figure 
1. On average, the estimated the hazard of firm shutdown rises up to the fourth year of 
age of the firm (positive duration dependence) and declines as the firm ages (negative 
duration dependence), as expected. Since the estimated hazards are computed from 
three  different  samples  and  refer  to  the  relative  risk  with  respect  to  the  baseline 
(constant  of  the  model),  the  lines  in  the  figure  are  not  directly  comparable.  The 
average risk of a firm shutting down for the period 2002-2009 is 0.03; and  for period 
2006-2009 is 0.05 (see Table 4). During recession, the hazard of shut down in the 
second year of age is 23% larger than the baseline; while the hazard of shutting down 
in the second year of age during the period 2002-2009 is 21% larger than that of the 
first year. Therefore, in times of crisis both the baseline risk of shutdown and the risk 
of dying in the first couple of years of firm survival are larger. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
As an exercise to further highlight the relative impact of the crisis on firm survival, 
we have computed predicted probabilities of firm shutdowns based on the estimates 
                                                 
12 We have controlled for firm unobserved effects in our models. For all three periods, the firm random 
effects are important, and account for more than 60% of the variance (rho). The formal tests, for each 
model, comparing the pooled estimator with this panel estimator (not shown here) reject the hypothesis 
that the panel-level variance (rho) is zero. 14 
 
for the period as a whole (column i). These predicted hazards are displayed in Table 
5. Our estimates reinforce the observations from the raw data (Table 3) and support 
the argument on the differential effect of credit constraints by firm size. Micro firms 
have the highest hazard of closing down, and this risk increases sharply in the years of 
crisis (from 0.05 in 2002-03 to 0.17 in 2008-09). The rates of firm shutdown are 
negatively related to firm size. The rates of shutdown of larger firms are not only 
smaller, but they also rise less sharply over the period of analysis. This is particularly 
so for large firms, which have a predicted hazard of shutdown of 0.005 in 2002-03 
and of 0.02 in 2008-09.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Therefore,  we  conclude  that  firm-  and  industry-specific  variables  are  significant 
determinants  of  the  risk  of  firm  shutdown,  and  that  macroeconomic  conditions  are 
important too. The effect of some covariates depends on the business cycle, though most 
of  them  are  statistically  significant  determinants  pre-  and  during-crisis.  There  is  a 
differentiated risk of firm’s closing depending on firm size, micro and small firms not 
only have a larger risk of failure, but also this risk is more sensitive to the business cycle 
as it rises more in times of crisis. 
 
4.2 Probability of workers separating from firms  
We next discuss the estimates of the probability of the worker separating from a firm 
and becoming unemployed – that is, the probability of a worker leaving a firm and 
taking more than one year to reappear in the dataset or not reappearing in the data at 
all. The analysis is again divided into three periods: 2002-2009, 2002-2005 and 2006-
2009,  and  the  estimates  are  presented  on  Table  6.  The  reported  coefficients  are 
average marginal effects obtained from the random effects probit model as specified 
in Equation 5.13  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Our estimates indicate that the probability of becoming unemployed falls with the 
wage  received.  A  one  log-point  increase  in  the  wages  of  workers  reduces  their 
probability of unemployment by about five percentage points over the period as a 
                                                 
13 The average marginal effects are interpreted as proportionate effects on the probability of 
becoming unemployed of a marginal increase (or a unit increase) in the explanatory variable.   15 
 
whole. If wages reflect the accumulation of firm-specific human capital and the value 
of the marginal product of workers, then high wage workers are more valuable to the 
firm in terms of skill, and hence are less likely to be dismissed. This hypothesis is 
supported  by  the  estimated  effects  of  skill  level  on  the  probability  of  becoming 
unemployed; less skilled workers have a higher probability of becoming unemployed. 
In  the  period  2002-2009  the  probability  of  a  low-skilled  worker  becoming 
unemployed  was  2.2  percentage  points  higher  than  that  of  a  high  skilled  worker. 
Women are less likely than men to become unemployed, and this emerges for both the 
overall  period  (2002-2009)  and  the  early  2000s.14  Differences  between  men  and 
women in the probability of entering unemployment became smaller in the period of 
the  global  crisis  (women  were  only  0.8  percentage  points  less  likely  to  enter 
unemployment than men).  
 
More educated workers are more likely to become unemployed (ISCED5/6 are 3.6p.p. 
more  likely  to  experience  unemployment  than  ISCED1  workers).  This  result  may 
appear surprising, but is possibly explained by results obtained in Ferreira (2009). The 
author concludes that more educated workers have a higher risk of making transitions 
out of a firm, but they are also more likely to find a new job within a shorter period of 
time than less educated workers.
15 As expected, workers on temporary employment 
contracts  are,  on  average,  seven  percentage  points  more  likely  to  experience 
unemployment than workers with more permanent employment relationships.  
A comparison of the impacts of worker characteristics on the probability of entering 
unemployment pre-crisis and during the crisis suggests that generally there is little 
change.  This suggests that the crisis did not affect which workers became more or 
less likely to become unemployed or the relative sizes of these effects. 
 
The  characteristics  of  firms  are  also  important  in  explaining  the  probability  of  a 
worker becoming unemployed. The smaller the firm, the more likely a worker is to 
enter unemployment. On average over the period, working in a large firm reduces the 
chance of becoming unemployed by 3.4 percentage points relative to working in a 
micro-firm. Firm ownership also affects the probability of unemployment. Over the 
                                                 
14 A similar result was obtained with Portuguese data by Ferreira (2009). 




period 2002-2009, workers employed by either public or foreign-owned firms are one 
percentage  point  more  likely  to  become  unemployed  than  workers  employed  by 
private home-owned firms. The effect of ownership status, though, changes during the 
business cycle. During the financial crisis of 2006-2009, workers employed by public 
firms  were  one  percentage  point  less  likely  to  become  unemployed  than  those  in 
private firms, while workers in foreign-owned firms were still one percentage point 
more likely.  
 
We can associate product market growth (industry change in employment from t to 
t+1) to unemployment, and it is inversely related to the chances of unemployment. 
Comparing  the  two  time  periods,  between  2002-05  industry  growth  increased  the 
chance of entering unemployment by 0.1 percentage points, while between 2006-09 
industry growth reduced the chances of entering unemployment by 0.2 percentage 
points.  This  may  reflect  patterns  of  voluntary  unemployment.  During  periods  of 
economic growth and industry growth, workers are more willing to quit and look for 
better job, while during recession, workers in industries that are growing stay in their 
jobs rather than quit. 
 
 The relative average wages paid by the firm in which a worker is employed are also 
statistically  significant  determinants  of  entering  unemployment,  and  the  effect  is 
stronger  in  the  lower  tail  than  in  the  upper  tail  of  the  industry’s  average  wages 
distribution. Working in firms that pay wages in the bottom quartile of the industry-
specific wage distribution is associated with a two percentage point higher probability 
of becoming unemployed, while working in a firm that pays wages in the top quartile 
of the industry’s wage distribution is associated with a 0.5 percentage point lower 
probability of becoming unemployed. Furthermore the effects of firms’ relative wages 
are stronger in times of crisis. Workers in high wage firms became relatively less 
likely to enter unemployment in 2006-09 relative to 2002-05 (0.4 percentage points 
compared  with  0.2  percentage  points),  while  those  in  low  wage  firms  became 
relatively more likely to enter unemployment (2.1 percentage points compared with 
1.6 percentage points).  
 
The estimated coefficients on the year indicators show that aggregate macroeconomic 
conditions strongly affect the chances of unemployment even when controlling for 17 
 
individual  and  firm  level  characteristics,  and  they  became  more  important  in  the 
period of the global economic crisis. The chances of becoming unemployed in 2008-
2009  were  eight  percentage  points  higher  than  those  of  becoming  unemployed  in 
2002-2003. The increased risk of unemployment caused by  aggregate  shocks also 
emerges during the crisis. The risk of becoming unemployed in 2008-2009 is seven 
percentage points higher than that of becoming unemployed in 2006-2007.  
 
Overall, during 2002-2009, a one percent increase in the hazard rate of firm shutdown 
increases the chances of unemployment by 14 percentage points. This suggests that, in 
the case of a firm closing down, workers are likely to take more than a year to find a 
new  job.  The  effect  of  the  risk  of  firm  shutdown  on  the  probability  of  entering 
unemployment  is  higher  in  the  pre-crisis  period  than  during  the  crisis  itself.  It 
increases the risk of entering unemployment by 29 percentage points between 2002 
and 2005, and by 9 percentage points between 2006 and 2009.  We therefore conclude 
that,  in  times  of  crisis,  the  chances  of  unemployment  become  less  related  to  the 
dynamics  of  the  firm  itself,  and  more  associated  to  the  general  downturn  in  the 
economic environment that affects all firms across the economy overall. 16  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
We  illustrate  the  relative  sizes  of  the  estimated  effects  by  computing  predicted 
probabilities of a worker entering unemployment by firm size and year. These are 
displayed in Table 7. The smaller the firm the higher the predicted probability of a 
worker becoming unemployed. However,   the evolution of the predicted probabilities 
of  entering  unemployment  differs  less  by  firm’s  size  than  the  probability  of  firm 
shutdown (shown in Table 5). The probability of becoming unemployed is negatively 
related to firm size, but the probability of becoming unemployed more than doubled 
between 2002 and 2009 for all firm sizes. This suggests that although larger firms are 
less likely to shutdown, they do not shield the worker from unemployment. 
 
                                                 
16 We included worker-firm random effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in match quality. 
The estimate of rho gives the proportion of the total variance contributed by the unobserved match 
quality. Our estimate of rho is statistically different from zero and indicates that unobserved match 
effects are responsible for over 54% of variance in the error term, and so we conclude that worker-firm 




5.  Conclusions 
The global economy was hit by a financial crisis and a subsequent recession from 
2007 onwards. This crisis severely limited the access to credit for both firms and 
workers. The financial crisis constrained the ability of firms to invest and expand, and 
the  ability  of  workers  to  borrow  and  consume  goods  and  services  both  directly 
through lower income growth and indirectly through, for example, job loss prompted 
by firm failure.   
In this paper we use micro data to identify resulting changes in the Portuguese labour 
market, both in terms of the survival of firms and in terms of job mobility. In terms of 
the likelihood of firm shutdown, in particular, our results suggest that firm-specific, 
industry-specific and macroeconomic variables are all important determinants of the 
hazard of a firm closing down. We estimated models separately for the pre-crisis and 
crisis periods and we conclude that the effects of the covariates were, in general, 
intensified by the downturn in the business cycle rather than being changed by it. 
Therefore,  we  conclude  that  it  is  likely  that  aggregate  demand  shocks  were  more 
important  than  market-specific  shocks  in  determining  the  risk  of  firm  shutdown 
during the global crisis. We have also attempted to verify the hypothesis that smaller 
firms  are  more  sensitive  to  monetary  shocks  than  larger  firms,  hence  having  a 
different response of firms, in terms of firm survival. And conclude that, conditional 
on the effects of the covariates, the estimated risk of shutdown is inversely related to 
firm size and is larger for smaller firms than for large firms. Although both rates of 
death rise during the global crisis, the risk of a large firm shutting down remains fairly 
low (2%) while that of a small firm reaches 17%. 
The failure of firms is expected to have an impact on the mobility of workers, and 
may become a potential source of problem in terms of unemployment. The financial 
crisis  may  have  increased  the  risk  of  cyclical  unemployment  becoming  structural 
unemployment (such a risk had already started to be pointed out by the OECD on the 
second half of the decade). We conclude for the importance of worker- and firm-
specific covariates in determining the risk of unemployment, and the effects of these 
covariates are in line with those obtained in previous research: women, low skilled 
and temporary workers have higher chances of becoming unemployed. The risk of 
unemployment is also larger for workers in small, private sector, and low-wage firms. 
We attempted to identify changes between the risk of a worker becoming unemployed 19 
 
for a year or more with the inherent risk of a firm shutting down. Our results suggest 
that during time of crisis the effect of the hazard of firm shutdown is less pronounced 
than it is in the pre-crisis period, thus suggesting that sectoral shocks are relatively 
more  important  a  determinant  during  economic  downturns.  The  analyses  of  the 
probability of unemployment by firm size also support this hypothesis. Although the 
probability of becoming unemployed is negatively related to firm size, it more than 
doubled between 2002 and 2009 for all firm sizes. This suggests that despite being 
less likely to shutdown, larger firms do not shield the worker from unemployment. 
And is a further signal that large firms react to economic downturns by adjusting their 
structure of production and employment levels, while small firms are more prone to 
leave the market.  
 
The  years  that  will  follow  are  of  most  importance  in  shaping  the  future  of  the 
Portuguese economy. Analyses of the structure of firms created after this crisis and 
the assessment of whether these firms are being created in higher value-added sectors 
will shed light on whether the economy is making the transition claimed by OECD. If 
so,  then  the  Portuguese  economy  is  likely  to  be  within  a  process  of  creative 
destruction  with  the  global  crisis  resulting  in  the  death  of  more  fragile  and  less 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1 Distribution of firms and workers by year, 2002-2009 
Year  Employment 










   (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)   (v)  (vi) 
2002  2,319,279  269,943  17,292  25,986  9.63  4.5 
2003  2,366,768  277,190  29,747  25,668  9.26  6.1 
2004  2,422,340  282,847  18,489  26,389  9.33  6.3 
2005  2,620,413  303,791  20,819  30,420  10.01  7.2 
2006  2,652,511  307,793  21,941  31,092  10.10  7.3 
2007  2,737,951  318,145  24,351  36,546  11.49  7.9 
2008  2,793,915  323,524  24,844  44,640  13.80  7.3 
2009  2,689,928  317,155  20,976  --  --  9.1 
Notes: Unemployment rates as of the 2
nd quarters of each year, source: INE. All 




Table 2 Distribution of firms and employment by firm size, average 2002-2009 
  % Distribution of 





Firm Size  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
Micro  83.66  27.21  94.31  93.23 
Small  13.91  27.35  5.24  6.03 
Medium  2.13  21.28  0.41  0.67 
Large  0.30  24.20  0.05  0.07 
Total  2,400,388  20,603,105  168,459  220,741 
 
 
Table 3 Death rates by year and firm size (%) 
Year  Micro  Small  Medium  Large  Total 
2002-2003  10.85  4.16  2.46  2.22  9.63 
2003-2004  10.43  3.68  2.93  1.92  9.26 
2004-2005  10.50  3.65  2.61  1.84  9.33 
2005-2006  11.21  4.03  2.78  2.40  10.01 
2006-2007  11.28  4.10  2.74  3.37  10.10 
2007-2008  12.76  5.11  3.59  2.77  11.49 
2008-2009  15.15  6.93  5.56  2.23  13.80 
Total  11.83  4.55  3.33  2.41  10.60 
Note: death rates are computed as the number of firms in year t that will die 













Firm size (baseline: micro)     
    Small  0.316***  0.288***  0.341*** 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
    Medium  0.224***  0.209***  0.272*** 
  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
    Large  0.184***  0.180***  0.218*** 
  (0.019)  (0.026)  (0.031) 
Firm growth (t, t+1)  0.994***  0.992**  0.995* 
  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Ownership status (baseline: private)     
    Public  0.622***  0.507***  0.802 
  (0.72)  (0.086)  (0.013) 
    Foreign  1.126**  1.233***  1.051 
  (0.041)  (0.063)  (0.053) 
Multi-establishment  0.600***  0.586***  0.607*** 
  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Industry growth (t, t+1)  0.997**  1.003  0.988*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Wages (baseline: average wage, industry  Q2-Q3)     
High wage firm  0.777***  0.809***  0.736*** 
  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
Low wage firm  1.225***  1.233***  1.290*** 
  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Year (baseline:  (i) 2002; (ii) 2002; (iii) 2006)     
    2003  1.242***  1.318***   
  (0.013)  (0.018)   
    2004  1.565***  1.716***   
  (0.021)  (0.037)   
    2005  1.818***  2.100***   
  (0.024)  (0.047)   
    2006  2.164***     
  (0.032)     
    2007  2.769***    1.658*** 
  (0.044)    (0.032) 
    2008  3.759***    2.515*** 
  (0.070)    (0.081) 
constant  0.033***  0.031***  0.045*** 
  (0.038)  (0.059)  (0.065) 
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
rho  0.609  0.653  0.656 
  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.010) 
Log Likelihood  -672,528  -343,896  -330,302 
No. of observations  2,083,182  1,133,771  949,411 24 
 
Notes: Discrete hazard model of firm shutdown with firm random effects. Hazard ratios reported, 
std errors in parenthesis (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). Coefficients on aggregate 
characteristics of the firm’s workforce, mentioned in Section 3, were included in the 
specifications but are omitted from the Table. 
 
 







Table 5 Predicted hazards of firm shutdown between t and t+1, 2002-2009 
Year  Micro  Small  Medium  Large  Overall 
2002-2003  0.047  0.013  0.008  0.005  0.041 
2003-2004  0.058  0.017  0.010  0.006  0.051 
2004-2005  0.069  0.020  0.011  0.008  0.061 
2005-2006  0.084  0.024  0.014  0.009  0.074 
2006-2007  0.096  0.027  0.016  0.011  0.084 
2007-2008  0.122  0.036  0.021  0.014  0.108 
2008-2009  0.167  0.050  0.029  0.019  0.148 
Note:  mean  of  predicted  hazards  by  year  and  firm  size  obtained  from 




Table 6 Estimates of probabilities of workers becoming unemployed for the period 2002-2009, 
and sub-periods 2002-2005 and 2006-2009 






Log(monthly real wage)  -0.060 ***  -0.052 ***  -0.045 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Women  -0.013 ***  -0.013 ***  -0.008 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Education (baseline: ISCED 1)       
     ISCED 2  0.012 ***  0.011 ***  0.011 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
     ISCED 3  0.011 ***  0.007 ***  0.013 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
     ISCED 5/6  0.036 ***  0.036 ***  0.031 *** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
Skill level (baseline: high-skilled)       
     Medium-skilled  0.006 ***  0.002 ***  0.004 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
     Low-skilled  0.022 ***  0.016 ***  0.017 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Temporary contract  0.071 ***  0.068 ***  0.064 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Firm size (baseline: micro firms)       
     Small firm  -0.012 ***  -0.007 ***  -0.007 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
     Medium firm  -0.027 ***  -0.020 ***  -0.016 *** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
     Large firm  -0.034 ***  -0.020 ***  -0.025 *** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
Ownership status (baseline: private)       
     Public  0.009 ***  0.022 ***  -0.010 *** 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
     Foreign  0.011 ***  0.005 ***  0.011 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)  
Industry growth (t, t+1)  -0.000 ***  0.001 ***  -0.002 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Average wage of firm vs. Average industry wages   
     High wage firm  -0.005 ***  -0.002 ***  -0.004 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
     Low wage firm  0.023 ***  0.016 ***  0.021 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Year (baseline 2002 in (i) and (ii); 2006 in (iii)) 
    2003  0.034 ***  0.039 ***   
  (0.000)   (0.000)    
    2004  0.047 ***  0.055 ***   
  (0.000)   (0.000)    
    2005  0.035 ***  0.052 ***   26 
 
  (0.000)   (0.000)    
    2006  0.031 ***     
  (0.000)      
    2007  0.045 ***    0.032 *** 
  (0.000)     (0.000)  
    2008  0.081 ***    0.065 *** 
  (0.001)     (0.001)  
Hazard 2002-2009  0.142 ***  0.293 ***  0.094 *** 
  (0.005) (0.011) (0.005)
rho                      0.543 0.672 0.629                     
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  
No. of observations  16,006,410  8,643,791  7,362,619 
mean pun(pu0)  0.114 0.081 0.074  
  [0.086] [0.076] [0.091]  
Note: Random effects probit models of probability of becoming unemployed controlling for match 
(worker-firm) unobserved effects. Standard errors in parenthesis: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
Standard deviations in squared brackets. Further controls include: age, tenure, firm growth (t, t+1), 




Table 7 Predicted probabilities of unemployment between t and t+1, 2002-2009 
Year  Micro  Small  Medium  Large  Overall 
2002-2003  0.099  0.074  0.059  0.051  0.070 
2003-2004  0.139  0.104  0.083  0.078  0.100 
2004-2005  0.152  0.115  0.092  0.087  0.111 
2005-2006  0.146  0.109  0.086  0.085  0.106 
2006-2007  0.143  0.106  0.083  0.082  0.103 
2007-2008  0.169  0.126  0.099  0.099  0.122 
2008-2009  0.238  0.176  0.141  0.139  0.172 
Note: mean of predicted probabilities of becoming unemployed, by year and 
firm size, obtained from estimates of the random effects probit model model 





Table A.1 Summary statistics of firm-level data: sample means of variables for the 3 periods analysed 
Variable  2002-2009  2002-2005  2006-2009 
Rate of death of firms  0.106  0.096  0.118 
Industry growth (t, t+1) (%)  1.911  2.695  0.974 
Firm growth (t, t+1) (%)  2.266  3.338  0.986 
Prop. High educ (%)  28.454  25.001  32.578 
Prop. High skilled (%)  33.369  32.541  34.358 
Prop. Medium skilled (%)  37.602  39.350  35.514 
Prop. Stable contracts (%)  58.123  58.587  57.570 
High wage firm  0.221  0.221  0.220 
Low wage firm  0.202  0.202  0.202 
Firm size (baseline: micro firms, <10 workers)   
Small firm (10 – 49 workers)  0.140  0.144  0.136 
Medium firm (50- 249 workers)  0.021  0.021  0.021 
Large firm (250+ workers)  0.003  0.003  0.003 
Ownership status (baseline: private)       
Public  0.001  0.001  0.002 
Foreign  0.011  0.010  0.011 
Multi-establishment  0.059  0.058  0.061 
Industry  (baseline: food, beverages & tobacco)   
Textiles, clothing, leather  0.035  0.038  0.031 
Wood, cork, paper  0.024  0.026  0.022 
Non-metallic products  0.016  0.017  0.015 
Metal products  0.037  0.040  0.034 
Furniture & other manufacture  0.016  0.017  0.016 
Electricity, gas, water  0.001  0.000  0.001 
Construction  0.152  0.156  0.148 
Wholesale & retail trade  0.309  0.313  0.305 
Hotels & restaurants  0.116  0.116  0.117 
Transport, storage, communications  0.044  0.044  0.045 
Post & telecommunications  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Financial intermediation  0.008  0.007  0.009 
Real estate  0.113  0.105  0.122 
Education  0.013  0.012  0.014 
Health & social work  0.042  0.040  0.045 
Other services  0.053  0.049  0.058 
Region (baseline: North coast)     
Center Coast  0.164  0.165  0.162 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley  0.332  0.333  0.330 
Inland  0.125  0.126  0.124 
Algarve  0.056  0.055  0.058 
Islands  0.037  0.037  0.037 
Age of firm (years, baseline 1 year old firms) 
2  0.069  0.074  0.062 
3  0.065  0.073  0.056 
4   0.062  0.071  0.051 
5  0.059  0.063  0.053 
6  0.056  0.051  0.061 
7  0.053  0.046  0.060 
8  0.047  0.042  0.053 
9  0.040  0.039  0.042 
10  0.037  0.036  0.038 28 
 
11-20  0.177  0.140  0.221 
21-30  0.176  0.192  0.157 
30+  0.110  0.122  0.095 
Year       
2003  0.133  0.244   
2004  0.136  0.249   
2005  0.146  0.268   
2006  0.148     
2007  0.153    0.335 
2008  0.155    0.341 




Table A.2 Summary statistics of worker-level data: sample means of variables for the 3 periods 
analysed 
Variable  2002-2009  2002-2005  2006-2009 
Unemployment  0.139  0.143  0.134 
Log(monthly) wages  6.552  6.550  6.555 
Tenure  7.522  7.550  7.488 
Experience  20.797  20.655  20.963 
Hazard of firm shutdown   0.035  0.024  0.047 
Women  0.442  0.435  0.450 
Education (baseline: ISCED1)     
ISCED2  0.211  0.197  0.227 
ISCED3  0.204  0.188  0.222 
ISCED56  0.112  0.097  0.129 
Skill (baseline:high-skill)     
Medium Skill  0.413  0.427  0.396 
Low-skill  0.371  0.365  0.377 
Type of contract (baseline: open-end)   
Closed-end  0.225  0.206  0.247 
Other  0.046  0.052  0.039 
Firm wages       
High wage firm  0.488  0.497  0.477 
Low wage firm  0.114  0.108  0.121 
Firm size (baseline: micro firms, <10 workers)   
Small firm (10 – 49 workers)  0.282  0.284  0.279 
Medium firm (50 – 249 workers)  0.228  0.228  0.228 
Large firm (250+ workers)  0.260  0.258  0.263 
Multiestablishment   0.357  0.351  0.364 
Ownership status (baseline: private)     
Public  0.035  0.036  0.034 
Foreign  0.101  0.097  0.105 
Industry  (baseline: food, beverages & tobacco)   
Textiles, clothing, leather  0.083  0.092  0.073 
Wood, cork, paper  0.030  0.032  0.027 
Non-metallic products  0.039  0.041  0.035 
Metal products  0.072  0.078  0.066 
Furniture & other manufacture  0.017  0.018  0.017 
Electricity, gas, water  0.006  0.006  0.005 
Construction  0.125  0.126  0.124 
Wholesale & retail trade  0.204  0.203  0.205 
Hotels & restaurants  0.067  0.065  0.069 29 
 
Transport, storage, communications  0.046  0.046  0.046 
Post & telecommunications  0.014  0.015  0.012 
Financial intermediation  0.033  0.033  0.033 
Real estate  0.112  0.103  0.123 
Education  0.021  0.019  0.024 
Health & social work  0.058  0.051  0.065 
Other services  0.036  0.034  0.039 
Region (baseline: North coast)     
Center Coast  0.143  0.146  0.139 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley  0.414  0.412  0.415 
Inland  0.082  0.082  0.083 
Algarve  0.035  0.033  0.036 
Islands  0.039  0.039  0.039 
Year (baseline: 2002)       
2003  0.131  0.243   
2004  0.135  0.251   
2005  0.147  0.272   
2006  0.149     
2007  0.154    0.334 
2008  0.157    0.342 
No. of observations  16,006,410  8,643,791  7,362,619 
 
 